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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici,
scholars of constitutional law,
citizenship, and of the jurisprudence of the federal
courts, believe that their expertise would be of use to
this Court in considering the scope and proper
exercise of the federal courts’ remedial authority in
cases challenging the constitutionality of gender
disparities in citizenship statutes.
A complete list of the Amici joining in this brief
is provided in an Appendix at the back of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Three well-established principles outline the
proper approach for a federal court to follow when
faced with a statute that violates equal protection.
First, and centrally, the victim of the wrong is to be
placed, to the maximum extent possible, in the
position he or she would have occupied but for the
wrong. Second, out of respect for legislative decisions
and separation of powers, courts remedying
unconstitutional disparities in a statute should alter
the statute as little as possible. Third, this Court’s
jurisprudence
typically
aims
to
eliminate
unconstitutional disparities in the provision of a
statutory benefit by extending and applying the
specified benefit to the disfavored class rather than
by withdrawing it from the favored class.
1 Counsel of record for all parties have consented in writing
to the filing of this brief.

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no person or entity other than amicus curiae or their
counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief.
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Here, the Second Circuit properly applied this
Court’s conventional practices when finding a
constitutional violation. The fundamental remedial
goal of restoring Respondent to his rightful position
can only be achieved in this case through extension,
not nullification: citizenship cannot be withdrawn
from those who have already become citizens
pursuant to § 1409(c), even though they are—but for
the sex of their American-citizen parent—identically
situated to Respondent. Moreover, even prospective
nullification of § 1409(c) would frustrate Congress’s
clear intention to confer citizenship on the children
covered by it. Thus, what the Second Circuit did here
was to follow established precedent when faced with
an unconstitutional aspect of a statute by replacing a
gender-specific term with its gender-neutral
equivalent.
The finding that Respondent is entitled to
citizenship
under
§ 1409(c)—once
the
unconstitutional gender disparity is removed from
the statute—is well within the authority of the courts.
Respondent’s
claim
is
that,
but
for
an
unconstitutional gender classification, he satisfies the
statutory criteria for citizenship.
It is the
responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate such
claims, and—if a statute is found unconstitutional—
to determine how the statute can be applied in the
way most consistent with the congressional
enactment. Indeed, statutory grants of citizenship—
and citizenship more generally—are of special
concern to this Court, which has repeatedly
recognized the citizenship of individuals upon the
invalidation of statutes that denied them citizenship.
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Thus, this Court ought not depart from its ordinary
practice of remedying unconstitutional provisions
while leaving statutes intact.
The central issue of gender-based classifications in
this case has been before this Court previously, and
six Justices have recognized that if § 1409(c) is found
unconstitutional, there is no constitutional obstacle
to the type of relief sought in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT, RESPECTFUL OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ORDINARILY
REMEDIES STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF
EQUAL
PROTECTION
BY
KEEPING
INTACT
AS
MUCH
OF
THE
CONGRESSIONAL
ENACTMENT
AS
POSSIBLE.

A holding that a statute violates equal protection
raises the question of how federal courts should
remedy the constitutional defect while hewing as
closely as possible to the congressional scheme. That
question is not a novel one. Rather, three wellestablished principles outline the proper approach.
First, the most fundamental principle of remedies is
that the victim of a legal wrong is to be placed, as
near as may be, in the position he or she would have
occupied but for the wrong. Second, out of respect for
legislative decisions and separation of powers, this
Court strives to implement the provisions of statutes
to the maximum extent consistent with remedying
the unconstitutional disparity. Third, ordinarily,
unconstitutional disparities in the provision of a
statutory benefit are eliminated by extending the

4
benefit to the disfavored class rather than by
withdrawing it from the favored class.
The Second Circuit’s remedial approach—
“[c]onforming the immigration laws Congress enacted
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,”
Pet. App. 41a—adheres to these longstanding
principles. The Government’s proposed remedy—
which would deny citizenship to many on whom
Congress expressly conferred it, while at the same
time leaving the Equal Protection violation largely
unremedied—does not.
A. Equal
Protection
Violations
Are
Remedied
By
Placing
Victims
of
Discrimination in the Position They
Would Have Occupied But For the
Violation.
The core principle of the law of remedies—and the
ordinary remedy for constitutional violations—is that
the victim of a legal wrong is to be restored, to the
maximum extent feasible, to the position he or she
would have occupied in the absence of the wrong.
“With respect to both compensatory and preventive
remedies, the goal is to restore or maintain plaintiff’s
rightful position.”
Douglas Laycock, Modern
American Remedies 265 (4th ed. 2010); see also id. at
14–15 (defining the rightful position as the “position
plaintiff would have been in but for the wrong”); 1
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.4(7) at 118 (2d ed.
1993) (equitable remedy should “restore the plaintiff
to her entitlement, no more, no less”).
This principle is particularly clear in equal
protection cases. As this Court explained in United
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States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), “[a] remedial
decree . . . must closely fit the constitutional violation;
it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally
denied an opportunity or advantage in ‘the position
they would have occupied in the absence of
[discrimination].’” Id. at 547 (third alteration in
original) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
280 (1977)); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
89 (1995) (goal is “restoring the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of that conduct”); Estes
v. Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437,
447 (1980) (same). As this Court has interpreted the
principle, it means not only that ongoing
unconstitutional discrimination must be eliminated,
but that the remedy must “‘eliminate [so far as
possible] the discriminatory effects of the past.’”
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 (alteration in original)
(quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,
154 (1965)).
B. The Court Should Invalidate As Little Of
a Statute As Necessary to Correct the
Constitutional Infirmity.
When one aspect of an otherwise valid statute is
unconstitutional, this Court has long applied a
“presumption of separability.”
Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6; see
also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1333 (2000). This principle that
the unconstitutional portion of a statute ordinarily
may be excised, leaving the rest of the statute
effective, goes back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
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Cranch) 137 (1803), which invalidated only a single
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 while leaving
the rest of the statute standing. See Michael C. Dorf,
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 235, 250 (1994).
The principle reflects both the practice of this
Court and the severance clauses frequently provided
in statutes. Indeed, the principle was expressly
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952))
(“1952 Act”), which contains a severance clause that
provides: “If any particular provision of this Act, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance,
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act . . . shall not
be affected thereby.” 1952 Act § 406.
In severing the unconstitutional portion of a
statute, this Court is careful to avoid “nullify[ing]
more of a legislature’s work than is necessary.”
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). Indeed, because “[a] ruling
of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people,” Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality op.), this
Court is guided by congressional intent and seeks the
narrowest invalidation possible, “enjoin[ing] only the
unconstitutional applications of a statute while
leaving other applications in force, or . . .sever[ing] its
problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29 (internal citation
omitted) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
20-22 (1960) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 227-29 (2005)).
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Although the cases frequently speak of “severing”
the unconstitutional portion of a statute, the remedy
for an unconstitutional statute may, as applied in
particular situations, stop the unconstitutional
application of a provision while applying the rest of
the statute with minor alterations that are necessary
to eliminate constitutional deficiencies. For example,
in Califano v. Westcott, the Court endorsed the
district court’s decision to replace the statutory word
“father” with its “gender-neutral equivalent.” 443
U.S. 76, 92 (1979). Similarly, in Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), after finding that
a prohibition on material that “incites . . . lust”
violated the First Amendment, the Court did not
excise the word “lust” but instead effectively qualified
it by holding that the statute would be “invalidated
only insofar as the word ‘lust’ is to be understood as
reaching protected materials.” Id. at 504.
At the same time, respect for legislative
prerogatives has also led this Court to minimize any
alteration of statutes; when there are several ways in
which a statute’s constitutional defect might be
remedied, this Court has disapproved options that
require “more extensive” rewriting of a statute in
favor of those that minimize any such rewriting. Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 509–10 (2010) (declining to “blue pencil”
multiple provisions of statute); see Tobias A. Dorsey,
Sense and Severability, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 894
(2012) (“When there is more than one way to [render
the statute constitutional], the Court should choose
the approach that does the least damage to the
institutions and activities contemplated by the law.”)
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In short, “when confronting a constitutional flaw
in a statute, [the Court] tr[ies] to limit the solution to
the problem,” id. at 904, by fashioning a remedy
consistent with what “‘Congress would have intended’
in light of the Court’s constitutional holding,” Booker,
543 U.S. at 246 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996)
(plurality op.)).
C. This
Court
Ordinarily
Remedies
Unconstitutional Discrimination In the
Provision of A Statutory Benefit by
Extending the Benefit to the Disfavored
Class, Not by Withdrawing It From the
Class Congress Intended to Benefit.
When this Court finds that a disparity in
conferring statutory benefits violates the Equal
Protection Clause, it must then decide how it will
eliminate the unconstitutional disparity. Such a
disparity can be eliminated by either “withdrawal of
benefits from the favored class [or] by extension of
benefits to the excluded class.” Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Thus, the Court must decide whether to “level up”
or “level down” the statute such that the
unconstitutional classification is removed, and it
makes this decision by looking to congressional intent.
See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“In exercising the broad discretion conferred by a
severability clause it is, of course, necessary to
measure the intensity of commitment to the residual
policy and confer the degree of potential disruption of
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the statutory scheme that would occur by extension
as opposed to abrogation.”); see also Deborah Beers,
Extension Versus Invalidation of Underinclusive
Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 115 (1975) (the Court focuses primarily
on legislative intent when determining whether to
extend or invalidate a constitutionally defective
statute).
In addressing this question of how to cure an
unconstitutional disparity in conferring benefits, this
Court has consistently “suggested that extension,
rather than nullification, is the proper course.”
Califano, 443 U.S. at 89. As then-Professor Ginsburg
wrote in 1979, by extending under-inclusive statutes
when they fail to comport with the Equal Protection
Clause, “[t]he courts act legitimately . . . to preserve a
law by moderate extension where tearing it down
would be far more destructive of the legislature’s will.”
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial
Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 324 (1979).
Califano v. Westcott is instructive. There, the
Court addressed an unconstitutional classification in
the Social Security Act that granted benefits to
families with dependent children only if the father,
not the mother, became unemployed. 443 U.S. at 78.
After first concluding that its prior decisions
“suggest[ed] strongly” that the Court possessed the
remedial capacity “to order extension” of benefits
under a statute, the Court held that the statute’s
constitutional defect was properly remedied “by
ordering that ‘father’ be replaced by its genderneutral equivalent.” Id. at 91–92. As a result of this
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modification, “benefits simply will be paid to families
with an unemployed parent on the same terms that
benefits have long been paid to families with an
unemployed father.” Id at 92.
The Court emphasized that it reached this
conclusion because extension of benefits was in line
with congressional intent, noting that the withdrawal
of benefits from “[a]pproximately 300,000 needy
children . . . would impose hardship on beneficiaries
whom Congress plainly meant to protect.” Id. at 90.
Moreover, the Court explained that “[t]he presence in
the Social Security Act of a strong severability clause
likewise counsels against nullification, for it
evidences a congressional intent to minimize the
burdens
imposed
by
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of
government largesse.” Id. (internal citation omitted);
see also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 363–64 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting that a “broad severability clause”
is “[i]ndicative of the breadth of the judicial mandate”
to “extend[] the statute”). Thus, the Court “adopted
the simplest and most equitable extension possible”
to ensure that the “beneficiaries whom Congress
plainly meant to protect” remained covered by the
statute. Califano, 443 U.S. at 90, 92–93.
Many other cases are to the same effect. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(extending Social Security benefits to men and
women on equal terms to remedy Equal Protection
violation); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 63738 (1974) (same); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 691 n.25 (1973) (plurality op.) (same, and noting
that its “conclusion in no wise invalidates the
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statutory schemes except insofar as they require a
female member to prove the dependency of her
spouse”); see also Candace S. Kovacic, Remedying
Underinclusive Statutes, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 49-50
nn.66-72 (1986) (collecting cases).
Thus, as the Second Circuit noted in this case, this
Court has consistently remedied Equal Protection
violations by extending, rather than contracting, the
statutory benefit. Pet. App. 38a–39a. Indeed, the
only case in which the Court took a contrary view is
the exception that proves the rule, as it turned on the
existence of clear congressional intent not to extend
the statutory benefits. In Heckler v. Mathews, 465
U.S. 728 (1984), the statute’s severability clause and
the legislative history behind it made clear that if the
statutory provision was “found invalid . . . the
application of the exception clause would not be
broadened to include persons or circumstances that
are not included within it.” Id. at 733-34. Consistent
with that specific congressional directive, the Court
in Mathews recognized that “the severability clause
would prevent a court from redressing [any]
inequality by increasing the benefits payable to
appellee.” Id. at 738. At the same time, the Court
recognized that, absent such clear congressional
intent,
“ordinarily
‘extension,
rather
than
nullification, is the proper course.’” Id. at 739 n.5
(quoting Califano, 443 U.S. at 89).
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II. THE
SECOND
CIRCUIT
PROPERLY
REMEDIED
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFECT HERE BY APPLYING THE
BENEFITS OF SECTION 1409(C) TO BOTH
MOTHERS AND FATHERS.
In this case, the Court is faced with a choice
between remedying the constitutional defect in
§ 1409 by (1) nullifying § 1409(c) altogether, thereby
withdrawing the benefit of citizenship from children
of unwed citizen mothers who cannot otherwise meet
the longer presence requirements of § 1409(a), or (2)
expanding § 1409(c) to apply to both men and women,
thereby providing the congressional benefit of
citizenship to children born abroad to unwed citizen
fathers on the same terms as this benefit is granted
to children of unwed citizen mothers. Amici submit
that under the well-established principles described
above, the Second Circuit’s decision to remedy the
constitutional defect by application of the provisions
of § 1409(c) to Respondent and others in his position
was correct.
First, the fundamental remedial goal of restoring
Mr. Morales-Santana to his rightful position can only
be achieved through extension, not nullification. As
the Government concedes, nullification can create
only prospective equality, making citizenship under
§ 1409(c) unavailable in the future both to children
born to unwed male citizens and those born to unwed
female citizens. It cannot produce equality as to
those, like Respondent, who have already been born,
because the Constitution does not permit the
withdrawal of citizenship from those who are already
citizens. See Pet. Br. 52; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.

13
253 (1967). Respondent will be denied citizenship,
while otherwise identically situated children of
unwed female citizens will continue to be citizens.
A remedy that leaves such an ongoing disparity
falls short of what this Court has traditionally
considered necessary to remedy an Equal Protection
violation. As the Court stated in United States v.
Virginia, “[a] proper remedy for an unconstitutional
exclusion . . . aims to ‘eliminate [so far as possible] the
discriminatory effects of the past’ and to ‘bar like
discrimination in the future.’” 518 U.S. at 547
(second alteration in original) (quoting Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. at 154).
In that respect, this case resembles Iowa-Des
Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931),
in which a taxpayer subjected to discriminatory
taxation was held to be entitled to a refund, where
the “nullification” remedy—“an increase of the taxes
which the [favored taxpayers] should have paid,” id.
at 247—was likely impossible.
As Professor
Ginsburg noted, “due process . . . would impede state
officials from reaching back to impose and collect
additional taxes from the favored competitors.” 28
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. at 307; see also McKesson Corp. v.
Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
34–35 (1990) (describing an earlier case, Montana
National Bank, as finding prospective-only relief
inadequate to remedy a discriminatory tax because
that would “not cure the mischief which had been
done under the earlier construction” (quoting
Montana National Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276
U.S. 499, 504 (1928)). As in these cases, the inability
of a nullification remedy to remedy the past
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unconstitutional discrimination should weigh heavily
against its adoption.
Second, in the absence of a “clearly expressed []
preference for nullification, rather than extension”
from Congress, as there was in Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. at 739 n.5, this Court should follow its
ordinary practice, described above, of remedying
Equal Protection violations by applying the benefits
of § 1409(c) on a nondiscriminatory basis, rather than
nullifying them. We are aware of no evidence that
Congress would have preferred nullifying § 1409(c)
altogether, let alone the sort of clear expression
necessary to justify a departure from this Court’s
ordinary preference for extension over nullification.
Third, although Amici do not purport to have
special expertise concerning the intentions of the
Congress that enacted § 1409(c), it appears that
nullification of § 1409(c) would do far more to alter
and frustrate the legislative scheme than would its
extension to Respondent and those similarly situated.
At a minimum, nullification would frustrate
Congress’s clear intention to grant derivative
citizenship to children of unwed citizen mothers who
had been present in the United States for at least one
continuous year before giving birth. Further, one of
the motivations behind the Act, was the “policy of
preserving the unity of the family.” S. Rep. No. 811515 at 433–34 (Apr. 20, 1950). And the increased
difficulty of children obtaining the same citizenship
as their American parent only heightens the
possibility that family members will be separated
from one another, contrary to Congress’ intention,
through § 1409(c), to promote family unification. For
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this reason, too, extension, rather than nullification,
of the conferred benefit here appears more consistent
with Congress’s intent.
Moreover, the INA, like the statute at issue in
Califano, contains a strong severability clause.
Although this clause alone does not fully address the
question of congressional intent here, see Welsh, 398
U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring), its presence
“evidences a congressional intent to minimize the
burdens
imposed
by
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of
government largesse,” Califano, 443 U.S. at 90.
Perhaps more significantly, the “burdens” that
would result from nullification of the benefit
conferred by Congress here are particularly heavy
because of the importance of the benefit at issue:
citizenship. “Citizenship is a most precious right,”
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159
(1963), particularly in the United States. See, e.g.,
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122
(1943) (“[I]t is safe to assert that nowhere in the
world today is the right of citizenship of greater
worth to an individual than it is in this country. It
would be difficult to exaggerate its value and
importance. By many it is regarded as the highest
hope of civilized men.”). Just as the nullification of a
benefits program that impacted “300,000 needy
children . . . would impose hardship on beneficiaries
whom Congress plainly meant to protect,” the
elimination of derivative citizenship for the class
covered by § 1409(c) would exclude from the national
community a group that Congress expressly deemed
to be citizens. See Califano, 443 U.S. at 90.
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In addition, by the Government’s account, in the
absence of § 1409(c), there was a “substantial risk
that a child born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen
mother in a country employing jus sanguinis rules of
citizenship would be stateless at birth unless the
child could obtain the citizenship of his mother.” Pet.
Br. at 34. 2 Whatever the congressional motivation
related to statelessness when the statute was enacted,
the possibility that nullification of § 1409(c) would
not only have deprived its beneficiaries of U.S.
citizenship, but by the Government’s account might
have rendered many of them stateless, makes it even
less likely that Congress, faced with the choice, would
have elected to eliminate § 1409(c).
The Government warns that extension of § 1409(c)
to Respondent and others like him would open the
floodgates to “untold numbers” of foreigners. Pet. Br.
51. But the Government provides no basis to believe
that the “untold” number of individuals who (1)
desire to claim U.S. citizenship, (2) were born out of
wedlock to a U.S. citizen father, and (3) met the other
applicable requirements of § 1409(c), including those
relating to legitimation and/or parental responsibility,

As the Statelessness Scholars demonstrate, when enacted
any risk of statelessness was not specific to children of
American mothers; the ten-year residence requirement also put
the foreign-born nonmarital children of American fathers at risk
of statelessness. Resp. Br. 37–38. Hence, a remedy that “levels
down” would arguably increase statelessness among foreignborn nonmarital children of American mothers and fathers, and
would thus run contrary to the Congress’s purported purpose in
enacting § 1409(c).
2
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is extraordinarily large. 3 Nor does the Government
explain why a Congress that chose to confer
citizenship on an equally “untold” number of children
of unwed U.S. citizen mothers would have been so
deterred by this prospect that it would have preferred
to eliminate § 1409(c) entirely.
Further, surely one could have characterized the
impact of Weinberger v. Weisenfeld as involving
“untold numbers” of widowers, but whatever the
numbers, the lessons of this Court’s law is clear.
Equal Protection remedies should respect the
congressional scheme and implement as much as can
be implemented while adjusting the statute to
eliminate its unconstitutional facets.
In sum, Amici are aware of no persuasive reason to
depart from the usual practice of remedying an Equal
Protection violation by extending the statutory
benefit to the disfavored class.
III. THE
SECOND
CIRCUIT’S
DETERMINATION
REFLECTS
A
CONVENTIONAL
APPLICATION
OF
ESTABLISHED
EQUAL
PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES, AND IS WELL WITHIN THE
AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS.
The
Second Circuit’s determination that,
“[c]onforming the immigration laws Congress enacted
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection . . . Morales-Santana is a citizen as of his
birth,” Pet. App. 41a, was a faithful and conventional
Those requirements have varied in different versions of
§ 1409(c) applicable between 1940 and the present.
3
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application of this Court’s guidance for remedying
Equal Protection violations.
Contrary to the
Government’s assertion that this holding “exceeds
the court’s authority with respect to naturalization,”
Pet. Br. 49, in violation of INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S.
875 (1988), the Second Circuit applied the provisions
of § 1409(c), save for its unconstitutional distinction
between fathers and mothers.
A. The Second Circuit’s Finding That
Respondent Is a Citizen Under the
Statute, Once Rendered Constitutional, Is
Squarely Within the Judicial Power.
The Government’s contention that the Second
Circuit’s decision was beyond judicial authority,
because the courts lack “the power to make someone
a citizen of the United States,” Pet. Br. 50 (quoting
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 883-84), misconstrues
Pangilinan and mistakenly conflates naturalization
with at-birth citizenship.
Although the federal courts have traditionally
shown significant deference to the political branches
with respect to immigration and naturalization, they
have properly distinguished between claims of
citizenship and claims seeking naturalization, and
have recognized the special status of citizenship.
This Court made clear nearly a century ago, in Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), that
individuals
claiming
citizenship
are
in
a
fundamentally different category from foreign
nationals, and unlike such foreign nationals—who
were subject to exclusively executive deportation
proceedings—are entitled to judicial review of their
claims.
“Jurisdiction in the executive to order
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deportation exists only if the person arrested is an
alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an
essential jurisdictional fact.” Id. at 284; see also
Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978) (“[T]he
Constitution requires that there be some provision
for de novo judicial determination of claims to
American citizenship in deportation proceedings.”)
Moreover, the authority of the political branches
over immigration and naturalization exists only
within the bounds set by the Constitution. When
“what is challenged . . . is whether Congress has
chosen a constitutionally permissible means of
implementing that power,” this Court has recognized
its “duty . . . of which it may not shrink, to give full
effect to the provisions of the Constitution.” INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41, 943 (1983). Indeed,
the Court has never hesitated to exercise its judicial
review responsibilities when, as here, an individual
claims that statutory provisions that would deny him
or her citizenship are unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 (1998) (plurality
op.); Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253 (termination of
citizenship unconstitutional); Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 166 (1964) (unconstitutional to discriminate
between native-born and derivative citizens); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation provision
unconstitutional).
This Court’s assumption of its responsibility to
recognize the citizenship of an individual upon the
invalidation of a statute that denied him or her
citizenship has deep roots. In United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 704 (1898), this Court
invalidated the application of the Chinese Exclusion
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Act, 22 Stat. 61—which, among other things, stated
that no “court of the United States shall admit
Chinese to citizenship.” Finding that the Act ran
afoul of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that Wong Kim Ark was
a citizen of the United States. See id. at 704-05.
In confirming the petitioner’s citizenship after it
had invalidated the statute’s unconstitutional
application, the Court emphasized that it was not
granting citizenship in contravention of Congress’s
plenary authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4.
Rather, it was recognizing that the individual met
the legal requirements for citizenship once the
unconstitutional statutory provisions were removed,
and that Congress’ plenary authority over
naturalization did not prevent a court from so
holding. See id. at 704 (“The fact, therefore, that acts
of congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese
persons born out of this country to become citizens by
naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born
in this country from the operation of the broad and
clear words of the constitution . . . .). Thus, the Court
in Wong Kim Ark—as in later cases like Afroyim and
Trop—saw its holding as a straightforward exercise
of its traditional judicial responsibility to “say what
the law is.” See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
This case is similar. As in Wong Kim Ark, the
Government denies that the Respondent is a citizen
on the ground that he fails to satisfy an allegedly
unconstitutional statutory requirement.
In
addressing the constitutional claim, it is within the
courts’ power both to determine whether the genderbased classification here violates Equal Protection,
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and—if it does—to determine whether it is more
faithful to Congress’s intent to cure the violation by
extending the benefits of § 1409(c) to fathers or by
withdrawing them from mothers.
Choosing the
former remedy does not amount to the creation of a
judge-made right to citizenship; rather, it is an
ordinary effort to effectuate congressional intent to
the maximum extent possible.
This case is therefore entirely different from
Pangilinan, in which the lower court ordered that
certain foreign nationals be naturalized as a judgemade equitable remedy that was concededly contrary
to congressional intent.
Critically, it was
“incontestable (and uncontested) that respondents
have no statutory right to citizenship,” 486 U.S. at
882-83, and the plaintiffs asked the Court to order
their naturalization by the “invocation of [its]
equitable powers.” Id. at 885. The Court rejected
this request, holding that it lacked independent
power to confer citizenship upon non-citizens: “the
power to make someone a citizen of the United States
has not been conferred upon the federal courts . . . as
one of their generally applicable equitable powers.” Id.
at 883–84 (emphasis added). However, while ruling
out any independent judicial authority to confer
citizenship, the Court left untouched the courts’
responsibility to adjudicate constitutional or
statutory claims to citizenship.
Indeed, in Pangilinan itself, after rejecting the
respondents’ request for an exercise of the courts’
general equitable powers as beyond judicial authority,
this Court went on to address on the merits—with no
suggestion of any lack of judicial authority—the
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respondents’ constitutional claims seeking identical
relief.
Here, the Court is in no way being asked to
exercise any purported independent judicial
authority to confer citizenship. Nor is it being asked
to order the naturalization of any non-citizen.
Respondent argues that under § 1409, as properly
(and constitutionally) interpreted, he became a
citizen at birth. The Court is being asked to perform
the core judicial function of remedying an Equal
Protection violation—a task which includes
determining how to eliminate the unconstitutional
portion of the statute in the way most consistent with
congressional intent. This classic judicial function
does not intrude on Congress’s authority over
naturalization in any way, and implicates no
constitutional concern. This Court’s role in filling
gaps and fashioning remedies for constitutional
violations is a familiar one, and one that properly
respects congressional authority.
See Daniel J.
Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional
Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1994).
For similar reasons, the Government’s reliance on
8 U.S.C. § 1421(d), which specifies that “[a] person
may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in the manner and under the conditions
prescribed in [Title III of the INA] and not otherwise,”
is misplaced.
Pet. Br. 51 n.11.
Here, what
Respondent seeks is not naturalization—the subject
of § 1421(d)—but rather a determination that by
operation of law he is already a citizen. As this Court
established long ago in Ng Fung Ho, individuals
claiming citizenship are in a fundamentally different
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category from non-citizens. 259 U.S. at 284–85.
Congress,
moreover,
has
incorporated
that
constitutional principle into the INA: Determination
of an individual’s claim of citizenship in a removal
proceeding is not governed by § 1421(d), but by
§ 1252(b)(5), which not only permits but requires the
federal courts to decide such claims:
See id.
(determination by court “[i]f the petitioner claims to
be a national of the United States”); see also Agosto,
436 U.S. at 753 (“In carving out this class of cases
[for judicial review], Congress was aware of our past
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that
there be some provision for de novo judicial
determination of claims to American citizenship in
deportation proceedings.” (citing Ng Fung Ho, 259
U.S. at 284)).
Because Respondent claims citizenship by
operation of law, and because he is not seeking an
exercise of general equitable authority, Pangilinan
has no application. Rather, the courts are fully
empowered to remedy the claimed Equal Protection
violation in conformity with conventional principles.
Whatever the breadth of the so-called “plenary
powers” doctrine, it cannot be read to reach
citizenship rights obtained through birth abroad, if
the statutory criteria for such citizenship are met.
B. Six Justices Have Indicated that an
Extension of
§ 1409(c) to Remedy a
Constitutional Violation Is a Permissible
Exercise of Judicial Authority.
This issue has been before this Court before, and
six Justices have, on prior occasions, determined that
there is no constitutional obstacle to the relief sought
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here. In Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), as in
this case, the Court considered a Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection “challenge to the distinction drawn
by section § 309 of the [INA], as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409, between the child of an alien father and a
citizen mother, on the one hand, and the child of an
alien mother and a citizen father, on the other.” Id.
at 424 (plurality op.). Although the Court splintered
on the merits, five Justices expressly recognized that
confirmation of the Petitioner’s citizenship following
the severance of an unconstitutional provision would
be an appropriate remedy and would not encroach
upon Congress’s plenary authority over matters of
naturalization.
First, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the notion
that the Petitioner lacked standing because, due to
the gender-based classification in § 1409, she was not
a citizen of the United States, and therefore had “no
substantive rights cognizable under the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. at 433 n.10. The plurality opinion
noted that “[e]ven if th[is] is so, the question to be
decided is whether petitioner is such an alien or
whether, as she claims, she is a citizen.” Id. In the
event that the Court concluded that the Petitioner
was indeed a citizen, the plurality explained, that
holding would not infringe Congress’s plenary
authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the
Constitution because a “judgment in her favor would
confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than
grant her rights that she does not now possess.” Id.
at 432.
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, echoed this principle in dissent. Rejecting
the claim that the Court was “powerless to find a
remedy,” Justice Breyer noted that the “remedy is
simply that of striking from the statute the two
subsections that offend the Constitution’s equal
protection requirement.” Id. at 488 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
“With
those
[unconstitutional]
subsections omitted,” the Petitioner would then meet
all of the requirements of the statute. Id.
As a
result, unlike in Pangilinan, the Petitioner in Miller
became a “citizen of the United States at birth” by
virtue of the statue passed by Congress, once cured of
its constitutional defect. Id. at 488–89 (alteration
omitted). As Justice Breyer explained: “Whatever
limitations there may be upon the Court’s power to
grant citizenship, those limitations are not applicable
here, for the Court need not grant citizenship. The
statute itself grants citizenship automatically, and ‘at
birth.’ And this Court need only declare that that is
so.” Id. at 488.
Three years later, in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53
(2001), Justice O’Connor added her voice to this
consensus. 4 Nguyen, like Miller and the present
dispute, again involved a Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection challenge to the “different requirements”
imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1409 “for the child’s acquisition
of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen
While Justice O’Connor participated in Miller, she
concurred in the judgment on standing grounds, and therefore
had no occasion to address the remedial issue. See Miller, 523
U.S. at 445 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
4
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parent is the mother or the father.” 533 U.S. at 56–
57. Writing in dissent, and joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice O’Connor expressed
her disagreement with the suggestion by the majority
that “[t]here may well be ‘potential problems with
fashioning a remedy’ were [the Court] to find the
statute unconstitutional.” Id. at 72 (quoting Miller,
523 U.S., at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)).
She offered three reasons for this conclusion. First,
severance of the unconstitutional portions of § 1409
was possible, and therefore a remedy could be
afforded to the Petitioner, because Congress included
a “general severability clause” in the INA which “is
unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that
Congress” intended for the “validity of the INA as a
whole, or any part of the INA to depend on whether’
any one provision was unconstitutional.” Id. at 94–
95 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Chahda, 462 U.S. at 932).
Second, she argued, as Respondent does here, that
nothing in Pangilinan precludes the confirmation of
citizenship by this Court, because petitioners did not
“seek the exercise of . . . equitable power[s],” but
instead the “severance of the offending provisions so
that the statute, free of its constitutional defect, can
operate to determine whether citizenship was
transmitted at birth.” Id. at 95-96.
Finally, Justice O’Connor noted that “this Court
has often concluded that, in the absence of legislative
direction not to sever the infirm provision, extension,
rather than nullification, of a benefit is more faithful
to the legislative design.” Id. at 96. Accordingly,
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Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality and
dissenting opinions in Miller that a remedy
recognizing the Petitioner’s citizenship would not
intrude on Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate
naturalization under the Constitution.
In sum, six Justices, including five of the Justices
in Miller, have recognized that no constitutional
problem is raised by the requested remedy here.
Amici’s point is not that this creates a binding
precedent entitled to stare decisis. Rather, it simply
confirms the extent to which the Second Circuit’s
ruling in this case—and the argument offered
above—is deeply consistent with longstanding views
on the authority of the federal courts to remedy equal
protection violations, in the field of immigration law
and otherwise. In contrast, only two Justices have
ever appeared to endorse the government’s argument
here—that the requested remedy confers citizenship
in violation of Congress’s plenary authority over
immigration. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73, 74
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Thomas, J.);
Miller, 523 U.S. at 452–53 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (joined by Thomas, J.). Indeed, as
Justice Scalia himself acknowledged, a “majority of
the Justices in Miller . . . concluded otherwise.”
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
*

*

*

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm
the judgment.
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